USPP3014: F. H. Bradley philosophizes that metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct: Metaphysics Research Paper, UUM, Malaysia

Compare the particular idea between this philosopher and other philosophers from different philosophies

• F. H. Bradley philosophizes that metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct, but to find these reasons is no less an instinct.
• D. M. Armstrong says “the problem of universals has the interesting characteristic that it is almost impossible to explain to the non-philosopher what the fuss is all about. It is truly a philosopher’s philosophy. Perhaps that should make us suspicious of it. Yet I believe that Plato’s instinct was correct when he treated it as the central question in metaphysics.”
• A. J. Ayer says “what is important to us is to realize that even the utterance of the metaphysician who is attempting to expound a vision is literally senseless; so that henceforth we may pursue our philosophical researches with as little regard for them as for the more inglorious kind of metaphysics which comes from a failure to understand the workings of our language.”
• F.H. Bradley says “unless thought stands for something that falls beyond mere intelligence, if ‘thinking’ is not used with some strange implication that never was part of the meaning of the world, a lingering scruple still forbids us to believe that reality can ever be purely rational. It may come from a failure in my metaphysics, or from a weakness of the flesh which continues to blind me, but the notion that existence could be the same as understanding strikes as cold and ghost-like as the dreariest materialism.”
• Martin Heidegger claims that Western languages are languages of metaphysical thinking, each in its own way. It must remain an open question whether the nature of Western languages is in itself marked with an exclusive brand of metaphysics, or whether these languages offer other possibilities of utterance – and that means at the same time a telling silence.
• Martin Heidegger insists that all metaphysics, including its opponent, positivism, speaks the language of Plato.
• Martin Heidegger declares that thinking does not overcome metaphysics by climbing still higher, surmounting it, or transcending it somehow or other; thinking overcomes metaphysics by climbing back down into the nearness of the nearest.
• Martin Heidegger says “metaphysics cannot be abolished like an opinion. One can by no means leave it behind as a doctrine no longer believed and represented.”
• Martin Heidegger says “What is meant by the talk of the end of philosophy? We understand the end of something all too easily in the negative sense as a mere stopping, as the lack of continuation, perhaps even as decline and impotence. In contrast, what we say about the end of philosophy means the completion of metaphysics.”
• Martin Heidegger claims that metaphysics is in all its forms and historical stages a unique, but perhaps necessary, the fate of the West and the presupposition of its planetary dominance.
• Immanuel Kant argues that it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects…We must therefore make trials whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge.
• Immanuel Kant stresses that there will therefore be metaphysics in the world at every time, and what is more, in every human being.
• Emmanuel Levinas says “there is no end to the end of metaphysics, and the end of metaphysics is our unavowed metaphysics, for no avowal will be its equivalent.”
• Bertrand Russell says “in every writer on philosophy there is a concealed metaphysic, usually unconscious; even if his subject is metaphysics, he is almost certain to have an uncritically believed system which underlies his specific arguments.”

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